1962 Debacle Revisited

1962: The War That Wasn’t by Shiv Kunal Verma ; Aleph Book Company, Rs.553, Pages XXI+425 This is a well-written book and charts in considerable detail, all the major battles of the 1962 conflict between India and China in both the north-east and western sectors. The narrative is riveting and supported by maps particularly of battles in the eastern sector, as well as reproductions of photographs of many important personalities and events associated with the conflict culled from multiple sources. They add heft and immediacy to the book that are lacking in most historical texts. To recreate in detail the accounts of battle, Verma certainly had access to personal reminiscences and he communicates the immediacy and tension of battle, as well as the bitterness of defeat with verve and feeling. For these reasons alone, this book must belong to the shelves of any student of India’s wars. The War that Wasn’t is not just an exercise in historical recreation but an attempt to put forward a particular point of view and explanation of events. And this is where it falters. The fact that the author wears his Army connections on his sleeve also means that this is a book that reflects a military mindset and thinking. Verma’s biases are often quite clear and of a piece with what many Army offices across generations since independence have largely thought of their politicians and leaders, in particular Jawaharlal Nehru, prime minister in 1962. And these biases seep through the pages at various points in the portraits that the author draws of Nehru and his supporting cast of incompetent minions on whose shoulders lies the blame for India’s defeat. To be fair, Verma does not spare the Army leadership either. He states while “Nehru, (Krishna) Menon and Bijji (Lt. Gen. B.K) Kaul become the focal points at whose feet India’s defeat was laid… (i)n a way, this acted as a smokescreen and most of the culprits responsible for the debacle got away scot-free. None of the senior officers were censured or brought to book,” and he isn’t afraid to take names throughout the narrative.  The susceptibility of Indian Army officers as they climb the hierarchy to political pressures or to engage in politicking themselves, is well known. However, equally important to note is the reality that right from the beginning of their careers, they accept senior officers’ orders even if they are patently lacking in logic or fairness. This is seen as a matter of “maintaining discipline” — the core consideration that separates the Indian Army from bumbling civilians. Officers might make mistakes but the Army has its own ways of punishing such lapses. In truth, the Indian Army has a massive colonial hangover — it has failed to realise that it is supposed to uphold political values quite different from what obtained when many of India’s regiments or armed units were first raised. What follows is fetishization — of the vardi, the uniform, unit cohesion or esprit de corps — and machismo of following orders.…