In-depth research and scholarship have made this book a fascinating account of the role of intelligence services in China during the turbulent past century, writes Parimal Maya Sudhakar
Chinese Spies: From chairman Mao to Xi Jinping
Roger Faligot
Harper Collins
Rs.699
616 pages
The rise of a nation in international politics is measured by its hard and soft power, and the effectiveness of its intelligence services. It is surprising that discussions on the rise of China in the 21st century have been centred more on its hard and soft power, but barely on the Chinese intelligence service. The CIA of the United States, KGB of Russia, MI6 of Britain, Mossad of Israel, DGSE of France, Naicho of Japan, and even MJIB of Taiwan, as well as RAW in India, are wellknown names in the world of spies and espionage. On the other hand, China’s Guoanbu is rarely mentioned in international relations discussions.
This vacuum is substantially filled by Roger Faligot in this book under review. Guoanbu has been remarkably successful in keeping itself out of the limelight outside China. Faligot’s account is a serious and detailed work to uncover the pervasive presence of the secret service in Chinese society as well as the world beyond.
Guoanbu, the short form of Guojia Anquanbu, i.e, ministry of state security, was formed in the early 1980s under the supervision of the great reformer Deng Xiaoping. This was the fifth modernisation silently initiated by Deng together with the famous four modernisations of industry, agriculture, science and technology, and military. Deng got rid of Maoist influence in the intelligence service by rebuilding it through the Guoanbu. After Deng passed on in 1997, his successor Jiang Zemin paid special attention to new domains such as cyber warfare, which is now one of the major strengths of China’s secret service.
The book is divided into three parts. The first part comprises six chapters, which narrate the complex details of the intelligence wing, how the intelligence services were used by the CPC (Communist Party of China) leadership from the days of the Long March to the Tiananmen protests, and preparations for the takeover of Hong Kong from the British. In 1984, the Ministry of State Security was restructured as Guoanbu and deployed in Hong Kong to prepare the ground for the peaceful transfer of the island to China in 1997. The Tiananmen protests of 1989 however, dented the image of Deng Xiaoping in the western world and apprehensions emerged about the future of Hong Kong.
However, it was prime minister Zhou Enlai, who had laid the foundations of the Guoanbu. During his long innings as the prime minister of China (1949-1976), he was chief diplomat in charge of China’s diplomatic missions abroad and foreign policy. The success of the 1949 Revolution was used in a masterly way by Zhou in spreading the influence of the CPC in most of the third world countries as well as in courting East European governments. In India, Zhou executed Mao’s orders to support the Naxalite movement and encourage splinter insurgent groups in India’s North East region.
After Zhou’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping mentored the intelligence system and ruthlessly used it to consolidate domestic power and promote Chinese foreign policy. According to Faligot, China infiltrated Guoanbu operatives into multinational firms in developed countries. He cites highranking officials to state that in 1997, Chinese spies were working in 170 cities in 50 countries worldwide.
The second part of the book has four chapters detailing the expansion of intelligence services under Jiang Zemin, Chinese secret agents’ entry into Afghanistan, growing cooperation between the Russian and Chinese intelligence agencies, economic espionage in the era of globalisation, and the rise of the Falun Gong movement.
Following Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan in the 1990s, China was the only important player in Afghanistan with Pakistan. Jiang Zemin’s China was quick to seize the opportunity to entrench its spies network in Afghanistan which proved very useful after the US-led invasion of the country toppled the Taliban in 2001.
In 2003, China witnessed the first peaceful transfer of power from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. The new regime diversified the intelligence service. Economic issues such as securing energy sources, winning contracts in other countries for Chinese companies, and acquiring technological know-how came centre-stage along with security and strategic interests. The State Council’s Research Bureau was transformed into a major centre for providing economic inputs directly to prime minister Wen Jiabao.
The third and final part of the book, with five chapters, deals with the acquisition of cyber warfare skills by Chinese secret service agencies, the Chinese modus operandi for successful conduct of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Xi Jinping’s rise as a powerful leader, the role of Xi’s Strategic Support Force, and the Covid-19 pandemic. The most important chapter in this book for contemporary times is ‘Cyber-Warriors of the PLA’, which unravels the layers of cyber espionage and attacks as well as counterespionage and counterattacks.
The opportunity to host the Summer Olympics of 2008 was the first megamoment for China to end its ‘century of humiliation’ (1842-1949). About 100 heads of state, 20,000 athletes, and 2 million visitors were in Beijing during the games, and it was a test of character and quality for the Chinese intelligence service to ensure that the gala event was successfully staged without any disturbances such as a terrorist strike by Uyghur nationalists or mass protests by the Tibetans or the Falun Gong.
The last chapter of the book highlights the controversies around the spread of the Coronavirus from China’s Wuhan lab. This chapter is a new inclusion in the book which was first published in 2019. The author provides details of the development of biological weapons by China until Beijing signed the international treaty against it in 1984. Meanwhile the CPC took advantage of the pandemic to crush the democracy movement and neutralise the Uyghur Muslims in Hong Kong and Xinjiang respectively.
In-depth research and use of large resources have combined to make Chinese Spies a fascinating account of the development and role of intelligence services in China in the past century. Details and data obtained from Chinese, French, British, Japanese, Korean, American, and Taiwanese papers and personnel substantiate the events of the last century as they have unfolded in China. This book is a must-read for China watchers, students of modern world history and operatives of national intelligence services. It also shows a mirror to India, albeit unintentionally, as one begins to compare the spread and depth of intelligence systems of India and China in the 21st century.